





McNollgast's article on legislative intent can be viewed as an exercise in
textual interpretation.1 As such, it represents an alternative to the currently
fashionable interpretive school of legal studies. Rather than play positive
political theory off against its contemporary rival, however, this comment will
instead play it off against an earlier research tradition: the studies of persuasive
communications undertaken by sociologists, social psychologists, and political
scientists of the behavioral tradition. Doing so helps to highlight the significance
of McNollgast's basic strategy as well as possible weaknesses in its application.
I refer back to this earlier tradition because its goal is similar to that of
McNollgast. While the former studied mass media messages and the latter study
statutes, the basic problem they both address is the attempt to understand the
content and impact of persuasive messages. The lessons learned from experience
with the one can therefore be applied to the other.
II
MEDIA STUDIES
I did my graduate work in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and, as did most others who passed through the department at that
time, I studied the field of "communications." The field formed the core of
M.I.T.'s political science curriculum, reflecting the centrality of Ithiel de Sola
Pool, Daniel Lerner, and Lucian Pye, and concentrated on the study of
persuasive communications. Developed to analyze the mass media, the field
received its primary impetus from the desire of social scientists and policymakers
to understand the rise of totalitarianism and, in particular, the political potency
of Nazi propaganda. Students of mass communications attempted to account for
the content of persuasive political messages and their impact upon public
opinion.
Communications research was empirically, rather than theoretically, driven.
In its North American guise, it began with a "busted" research project-the
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famed Erie County study of the Roosevelt-Wilkie election of 1940.2 In an
attempt to improve their research, scholars struggled to perfect their research
designs, heightening their capacity to control and measure key variables. The
result was a series of increasingly sophisticated studies over a period of nearly
three decades, giving rise to one of the few genuinely cumulative research
traditions in the social sciences.3 The magnitude and quality of this research
effort is suggested by the methodological innovations that it introduced, including
survey research, panel studies, experimental methods,4 laboratory research,'
field experiments,6 and content analysis.'
Communications research focused on a subject of compelling significance, and
its practitioners were true scientists who perfected methods of observation,
inference, and measurement. And, yet, few of us who attended M.I.T. chose to
remain in the field. There were various reasons, but for purposes of this
discussion only one is central, for it bears upon McNollgast's project.
The difficulty faced by students of the mass media was perhaps best signaled
by the agenda offered for the field by Harold Lasswell, one of its founders.
Lasswell defined the study of communications as the study of who says what to
whom and with what effect.8 As suggested by the increasingly convoluted
experimental variations undertaken by Hovland and his colleagues,9 this
formulation underscored the complex series of causal factors affecting the
content of any communicative act. Factors shaping the content of the
communication would include the following:
1. The communicator herself: her preferences, her inten-
tions, her stature and credibility, her perception of the
audience.
2. The audience: including its interest in the subject, its
preferences, its perceptions of the communicator and the
message and its exposure to other communicative acts.
3. The communicative situation: including whether the
audience is pre-selected or not, or captive or not.
The problem is clear: there is often but one piece of data, the text, but there are
a multitude of complexly interrelated variables that determine the content of the
2. The report on this project is contained in PAUL LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE
(1944). See especially the prefaces contained in the 1968 edition.
3. The apex of this research was perhaps achieved in Coleman, Katz, and Menzel's study of the
impact of advertising on the medical choices of doctors. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., MEDICAL
INNOVATION (1966). The best overview of this research tradition is Elihu Katz, The Two-Step Flow of
Communication, PUB. OPINION Q. 21, 61-78 (1957).
4. See, e.g., CARL I. HOVLAND ET AL., COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION (1953).
5. See Alex Bavelas, Communications Patterns in Task Oriented Groups, in THE POLICY SCIENCES
(Daniel Lerner & Harold D. Lasswell eds., 1951).
6. LEON FESTINGER ET AL., SOCIAL PRESSURES IN INFORMAL GROUPS (1950).
7. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL ET AL., THE PRESTIGE PAPERS (1952).
8. See generally BRUCE L. SMITH, PROPAGANDA, COMMUNICATION, AND PUBLIC OPINION (1946).
9. HOVLAND ET AL., supra note 4.
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text. Put crudely, the number of variables vastly exceeds the number of
observations. Phrased more elegantly (at least for a social science audience),
there is a problem of identification. Regardless of the way it is stated, there is
a massive problem of inference. Despite the brilliance of the investigators, then,
it seemed to many that the field was reaching a dead end, and many of us got
out of it.
The McNollgast article suggests that it may be time to get back in. One way
of resolving an identification problem is to introduce constraints on the values
or relationships between variables, either by drawing on "external" informa-
tion-such as prior experience-or on theory. Heavily empirical in its
orientation, the field of communications research lacked a strong corpus of
theory that would enable it to restrict the value of or relations among the
variables possibly affecting the content of communications. Viewed in this light,
the basic contribution of McNollgast is to propose and use such a theory-
positive political theory ("PPT")-and thereby to attempt to overcome the
problems of inference encountered by their predecessors.
III
SOME CRITICISMS
In the oral delivery of their article, the authors stressed the power of PPT as
a tool for creating inferences concerning the content of texts-in this case,
legislative acts. Should PPT be able to play this role, this would, indeed,
represent a major contribution. But in light of the comments made above, one
is also entitled to ask whether it is PPT or prior experience that the authors most
fruitfully bring to bear.
Upon reading their article, I am inclined to think that past experience, rather
than theory, plays the greater role. The existence of multiple decision points, the
broad distribution of veto power, the general composition of the enabling
coalition-all these stylized facts of legislative politics were well established
before they were incorporated into PPTs of the U. S. Congress. They were
established not by theorists but by political scientists "soaking and poking" in the
everyday life of the Congress. The most important contribution of their theory,
then, lies rather in the assumption of rationality and in the consequent
appreciation of the significance of backward induction. These elements of PPT
lead to inferences that might otherwise be missed; to offer one example, the
preferences and intentions of the president are incorporated into statutes that are
signed into law, even though the president is not a member of the legislature.
I am less sanguine about other results "derived" from theory in the
McNollgast article. In particular, McNollgast "derive" that spokespersons for the
legislation-those acting on behalf of the enabling coalition-are constrained
from strategic behavior; they are constrained truthfully to reveal their preferenc-
es. But PPT suggests that given the rules for the enactment of legislation and
the fact of judicial review, those moving earlier in the game tree-that is, the
enabling coalition-would anticipate the preferences of the court itself The
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legislating coalition might therefore itself behave strategically. The leaders of the
coalition, while faithfully reflecting its members' preferences, might be
articulating points of view that themselves are strategically contrived. The result,
then, is a contradiction in reasoning.
The major point I wish to make is that without incorporation of the
anticipated reaction of the judicial system, the theoretical program propounded
by McNollgast is not fully realized. This point notwithstanding, the spirit of
these comments is positive and constructive. I make them in an effort to
highlight and accentuate the contributions that McNollgast and PPT can make
in this effort to interpret the meaning of texts or, in this instance, the intention
of statutes.
